Nasim Zehra
That the new Pakistan President, Asif Zardari, is a mixed bag is undeniable. His eleven years in jail, the controversially ownership of Surrey Palace and much more, the inability of Pakistani courts during the Nawaz and Musharraf eras to convict Zardari, ............
the NRO under which he was released of all corruption cases and reportedly millions of dollars stashed in property and bank account was released to him, and his being party to the US-brokered power transfer arrangement, are all part of that mixed bag.
Then, the two new questions: one of his mental health and the other of the source of his the cash deposited in his Swiss accounts, his medical condition was explained by the information minister as arising out of his solitary confinement for several years and that he overcome it. The question regarding the source of his income, however, remains unanswered. This personally controversial individual has scored well in the first round of power and politics in the post-Musharraf democratic Pakistan.
While the broken agreement primarily over the judges has kept Pakistan’s other largest political party, the PML-N, away from Zardari, the rest of Pakistan democratic political forces have veered towards him. The ANP, MQM, BNP, JUI-F, the PPP(Sherpao) and even Qazi Husain Ahmed have announced that they will accept him as president.
This support is, after all, political, flowing from barter arrangements. With a prime minister from his own party, President Zardari will be in a position to enter into multiple agreements in exchange for support for his presidency. Some of the agreements, however, seem to have been already honoured; the Ramazan ceasefire and the re-opening of Jamia-e-Fareedia in Islamabad for instance. His key tactician in major complex political cum security issues, advisor Rehman Malik, has contributed to these arrangements. The near midnight announcement by the Balochistan Liberation Army of a ceasefire also is a result of Malik’s Dubai, Kabul and London meetings and communications, direct and indirect, with Baloch leaders in self-exile.
In his hasty yet democratic journey towards the presidency there were reservations regarding Zardari in the khaki camp. Playing yet his ultimate balancing role while staying within constitutional parameters the army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani, rejected all uniformed and civilian advice to promote the Bangladesh model. In the early August corps commanders’ meeting Kayani heard some of his men repeat the stories of the PPP government’s strategic shift away from China and towards America, the softening on India, the dilution in Pakistan’s position on the nuclear issue, the many circulating stories of extortion from businessman at the behest of the PPP leadership.
Some believe the democratic system should continue. Perhaps mindful of the army’s own multiple and complex involvement in internal security crises and the border problems, its limited yet critical role in fighting the international war on terrorism, and his experiential wisdom that armies are no fixing force for a state and society needing reform, Kayani ruled that the army would only perform its constitutional duties and though direct communication between the PPP co-chairman and the army. In this context, the concerns of the army and of its allied institution have been periodically conveyed to Zardari. The man armed with increasing democratic authorities has stayed the course of his travel plan into the presidency.
The PPP co-chairman seems to be a mere three days away from the presidency. After his taking over as president there will be eight issues of concern. One, while delivering on the many “IOUs” to the political partie supporting him will the problems of Balochistan, the NWFP and the militancy, which should be resolved in a sustainable manner for the concerned parties while strengthening the federation. Two, will a one-man show be strengthened or the parliamentary system be strengthened by honouring the earlier PPP commitment of implementing the Charter of Democracy and also the Seventeenth Amendment be repealed?
Three, will the PPP and the opposition ensure that checks and balances be strengthened by making the parliamentary and Senate Committees more competent and vigilant? Four, will the ways of governance be improved through adopting transparent ways in hiring and firing, in resource allocation and policy formulation? The appointments to date in key posts have largely been on the basis of loyalty and its past record of filling government and semi-government positions at all levels has been one of largely hiring PPP supporters. Pakistan’s economy, the second-worst performing after Burma in Asia, cannot afford messed-up governance.
Five, what systems are in place to making government deals transparent and free of major corruption possibilities? Six, in formulating security and foreign policy, will there be input of all stakeholders including the Parliament, technocrats and security institutions? This area requires particular attention, especially given that the government’s leading men, including Zardari himself, have worked very closely at a personal level with the Americans in achieving his political objectives. Hence, the need to make major policy moves transparent is crucial The concerns that the PPP government may move away from China as a strategic partner too need to be addressed through informed debate on the state of the relationship.
Six, a crucial factor for the strengthening of democracy will be civil-military relations. The armed forces remain a major stakeholder in the security of Pakistan, and hence will have to be engaged with trust and respect, but strictly within the parameters laid down by the Constitution. Already there are unconfirmed stories about key PPP men provided lists by the US of individuals who must be removed from senior positions within security institutions.
Seven, will the PPP play a zero-sum game with its only major political opponent, the PML-N? While competitiveness is at the core of politics, the PPP will have to play by democratic rules. The real test of its democratic credentials will come in its handling of its only real opposition party, one that may soon expand if the PML-Q returns to its parent party.
Eight, what form does the judiciary finally take? Obviously, the PPP refused to opt for the best, the most correct and most credible route to restoration of the deposed judges. Now, will the new president restore all the judges, including Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry? And on what scale of integrity and compete will the restored judges perform?
The answers to these questions will determine the future health of this setup and its survivability. With a fiercely independent media and an alert and demanding society, plus with virtually no margin of error available to the rulers in times of scarcity and multiples crisis, undemocratic, scheming, inefficient and corrupt governments will not last their term.
Meanwhile, with the belief that democracy is the best system for managing state and society it is not possible to deny Zardari’s right to be president. He has all but won democratically the post of the president. Against the backdrop of the many controversies he will be a very high-risk president. For many selfish reasons that all flow from the fact that Pakistan is the only home we have, we can only hope that Zardari defies the “dark predictions” made by many of us regarding his presidency. The democratic checks may just make it happen. Good Luck, Pakistan!
Nasim Zehra is an Islamabad-based national security strategist
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